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TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

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RUTAOK/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 3623
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0676
RUFHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1390
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1711
RUQMK/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0382
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1004
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 3406
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3808
RUEHLS/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 3761
RUTAND/AMEMBASSY N'DJAMENA 0484
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0459
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3776
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0577
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0211
RUTAH/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 1368
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2438
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3/DB-3D1/JSI-5B/JSW/DP/DIO//
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, E&ID, MASS, SHUM, CG

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CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 002
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. DOD ADDRESSEES TAKE THIS JOINT STATE/USDAO MESSAGE AS IIR 6 821 0069 84. REQ REFS (U) Z-DI3-CG001, Z-DI3-CG800.

2. SUMMARY: THIS COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE ATTEMPTS TO ASSESS, IN A RECENT HISTORICAL CONTEXT, THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS. PART I DESCRIBES RELATIONS AS THEY STOOD IN MAY OF 1982, WHEN PRESIDENT MOBUTU ANGRILY RENOUNCED U.S. ASSISTANCE IN HIS PIQUE OVER ZAIRE'S FALTERING ECONOMY AND PERCEIVED LACK OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ZAIRE. PART II TRACES THE RECOVERY OF BILATERAL GOODWILL, NOTING HOW OUR NEW POLICY OF STRESSING COMMON INTERESTS WHILE PROMOTING -- AND FACILITATING -- A ZAIRIAN DIALOGUE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAS WORKED IN PRACTICE OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS. PART III, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT EXCELLENT STATE OF BILATERAL PLAY, CONCLUDES THAT THE NEW APPROACH TO ZAIRE HAS BEEN TIMELY AND SUCCESSFUL, CONTRIBUTING BOTH TO THE SUCCESS OF ZAIRE'S STABILIZATION PROGRAM AND TO FRANKER, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS. PART III ALSO EXAMINES EACH COUNTRY'S PRESENT EXPECTATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP, AND ATTEMPTS TO HIGHLIGHT LIKELY AREAS OF FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDING OR CONFLICT.

I. MAY, 1982/RELATIONS AT THE NADIR

- ZAIRIAN PRIDE HAD BEEN WOUNDED DEEPLY IN THE LATE SEVENTIES BY U.S. POLICIES. PRESIDENT MOBUTU HAD EXPECTED UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR HIS STRATEGICALLY PLACED, ANTI-COMMUNIST REGIME. INSTEAD, U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS HIT ROCK-BOTTOM ON MAY 13, 1982 WHEN MOBUTU ANNOUNCED THAT ZAIRE WOULD NO LONGER ACCEPT U.S. ASSISTANCE. THOUGH THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF HIS ANGER WAS THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATION -- IN HARSHLY CRITICAL LANGUAGE -- TO REDUCE THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUESTED AID LEVELS FOR ZAIRE, OTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SLOW BUILDUP IN ZAIRIAN FRUSTRATION AND DISILLUSIONMENT. (THE PROBLEMS FACING MOBUTU TWO YEARS AGO WERE REMARKABLY SIMILAR TO THE PROBLEMS FACING HIM TODAY, BUT HE WANTED THE U.S. AND OTHERS TO COME UNQUESTIONINGLY TO HIS SUPPORT, MUCH AS HE REMEMBERED THE 1960'S, RATHER THAN RESPOND AS PARTNERS IN A COOPERATIVE VENTURE IN WHICH ZAIRE ITSELF WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO SOLVE THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS.)

- A. RELATIONS WITH THE IMF: ZAIRE'S MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE SPRING OF 1982 WAS ITS FALTERING ECONOMY. THE ZAIRIANS WERE INCREASINGLY CONVINCED THAT THE USG WAS NOT FULLY SUPPORTING -- INDEED WAS BLOCKING -- ZAIRIAN EFFORTS TO RETAIN THE CURRENT THREE-YEAR IMF PROGRAM. AT THIS POINT, THE USG APPROACH TO SOLVING ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

(ALSO, TO SOME EXTENT, ITS POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS), WAS BASED ON A STRATEGY OF SOLICITING HELP OR COORDINATION FROM ALL OR A COMBINATION OF ZAIRE'S MAJOR WESTERN PARTNERS TO FORM A "UNITED FRONT" TO PUSH REFORM ON ZAIRE. MOBUTU WAS EXTREMELY RESISTANT TO THIS KIND OF APPROACH BECAUSE IT FLEW DIRECTLY IN THE FACE OF HIS OWN STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE WEST: TO PLAY THE MAJOR DONORS AGAINST EACH OTHER. THE GOZ PERCEIVED THE U.S. AS PROMOTING THIS EFFORT AND THUS IN THE FOREFRONT OF ZAIRE'S CRITICS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 003
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

- B. THE BROOKE AMENDMENT: BROOKE BECAME A PROBLEM FOR THE FIRST TIME IN JANUARY OF 1982, AND THE ECONOMICALLY-STRAPPED ZAIRIANS FAILED TO UNDERSTAND OR ACCEPT THE PROBLEM, BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED INCORRECTLY THAT SUFFICIENT U.S. POLITICAL WILL COULD OVERTURN WHAT WAS, IN FACT, A LEGALLY IRREVOCABLE PROHIBITION ON NEW ASSISTANCE STEMMING FROM DELINQUENT GOZ DEBT SERVICE. ZAIRIAN BITTERNESS OVER BROOKE SANCTIONS WAS SHARPENED BY THEIR TIMING: THEY FELL LESS THAN A MONTH AFTER PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S DECEMBER, 1981 TRIP TO THE U.S., DURING WHICH HE RECEIVED HIGH-LEVEL ASSURANCES OF INCREASED AND ACCELERATED MILITARY AID, BUT HEARD NO MENTION OF THE BROOKE AMENDMENT. NEW MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, INSTEAD OF INCREASING AND ACCELERATING, SUDDENLY STOPPED. MEANWHILE, THE GOZ CONTINUED TO HAGGLE OVER FINE POINTS THAT PREVENTED THE CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REDUCE PAYMENTS NEEDED TO REMOVE BROOKE SANCTIONS.

- C. CHAD PEACE-KEEPING FORCE: FURTHER WORSENING ZAIRIAN ATTITUDES WAS A PERCEIVED LACK OF SUFFICIENT U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE ZAIRIAN CONTINGENT OF THE OAU'S CHAD PEACE-KEEPING FORCE (PKF). THE GOZ LEARNED THAT THE AID THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED BY THE U.S. WAS TO COME AT REDUCED LEVELS, IN FORMS NOT COMPLETELY TO THEIR LIKING, AND WAS TO BE SPLIT WITH THE NIGERIANS.

- D. THE C-130 DEBT: ALSO IRRITATING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WERE UNREALISTIC ZAIRIAN EXPECTATIONS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING ZAIRE'S C-130 DEBT IN ITALY. THE GOZ HOPED WE WOULD HELP, OR FIND A WAY TO PAY OFF THE ITALIAN FIRM WHICH WAS HOLDING NEEDED AIRCRAFT AND SPARE PARTS HOSTAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE GOZ HOPED THAT ZAIRE'S RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL (THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF RENEWED DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH TEL AVIV WAS MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH MOBUTU'S RENUNCIATION OF U.S. AID) WOULD INDUCE THE USG TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF BOTH MILITARY AND OTHER AID TO ZAIRE -- PERHAPS THROUGH THE ISRAELI MILITARY MISSION WHICH WAS ALREADY COVERTLY IN PLACE TRAINING THE BSP.

- E. HUMAN RIGHTS: WE CONTINUED TO TREAT THE ZAIRIAN

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CORRUPTION PROBLEMS BY CONFRONTING ZAIRE WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, A TOUGH HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR 1981, AND DEMARCHES ON THE STATUS OF THEIR JAILED EX-PARLIAMENTARIANS. MOBUTU AND HIS GOVERNMENT SAW AN ORCHESTRATED U.S. HAND IN THESE DISAPPROVING SIGNALS.

- NO ONE TOOK SERIOUSLY MOBUTU'S RENUNCIATION OF U.S. AID. THE ANGRY OUTBURST REFLECTED RAGE AT HIS REALIZATION THAT THE WEST -- PRINCIPALLY THE U.S. -- DID NOT CONSIDER ZAIRE IMPORTANT ENOUGH TO BAIL IT OUT OF ITS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. THE RENUNCIATION OF AID ALSO SERVED NOTICE TO THE USG THAT THE STANCE WE HAD HELD FOR HALF A DECADE TRYING TO "REFORM" MOBUTU WAS ONLY MAKING HIM ANGRY AND WAS NOT ENGENDERING POSITIVE CHANGE.

II. THE COURSE OF RELATIONS: MAY, 1982 - MAY, 1984

- U.S. POLICYMAKERS AT THIS POINT DECIDED TO ABANDON ATTEMPTS TO REFORM ZAIRE BY CONFRONTING IT WITH UNITED APPEALS FROM WESTERN DONORS, AND TO TRY A NEW, MORE BILATERAL TACK: CONVINCE MOBUTU THAT HE MUST DEMONSTRATE ZAIRIAN RESOLVE (NOT MERELY PROFESS IT) BY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETING AN IMF SHADOW PROGRAM TO EARN THE COUNTRY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519

SCR

PAGE 004

NC 4675519

TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

FUND ASSISTANCE. WE WOULD STRESS OUR COMMON STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS AND LET THE ZAIRIANS KNOW THAT WE WERE WILLING TO SUPPORT REFORM EFFORTS IF ZAIRE DID ITS PART. WE WOULD GIVE THE GOZ BREATHING SPACE BY REDUCING THE LEVEL OF HUMAN RIGHTS RHETORIC WITHOUT REDUCING OUR ACTIVE PURSUIT OF IMPROVEMENT IN THIS AREA. IN SHORT, WE ABANDONED THE ATTEMPT TO REFORM MOBUTU BY THE EXERCISE OF DIRECT PRESSURE IN FAVOR OF A STRATEGY BASED ON QUIETLY EMPHASIZING ZAIRE'S IMPORTANCE, OUR DESIRE TO HELP AND THE LIMITS IMPOSED ON OUR ASSISTANCE BY ZAIRE'S OWN FAILURE TO UNDERTAKE SERIOUS REFORM.

- A. ECONOMIC REALITIES AND THE IMF: THE SHIFT FROM CONFRONTING AND CRITICIZING MOBUTU TO OFFERING HIM ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN MOST PRONOUNCED -- AND SUCCESSFUL -- IN THE ECONOMIC REALM. IT SHOULD BE NOTED AT THE OUTSET THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE RIPE FOR A SHIFT IN APPROACH. PRESIDENT MOBUTU COULD SEE THAT THE LOGICAL RESULT OF CONTINUING AS BEFORE FROM FAILURE TO FAILURE IN ECONOMIC REFORM EFFORTS WOULD BE CERTAIN BASKET CASE STATUS FOR ZAIRE AND LESS SERIOUS ATTENTION FROM ZAIRE'S FRIENDS. WE COULD VERY CREDIBLY TELL HIM THAT -- AFTER ZAIRE'S FAILURE TO PERFORM UNDER ITS 1982 IMF PROGRAM -- THE USG COULD NO LONGER CONSIDER HELPING ZAIRE UNLESS THE COUNTRY WAS ABLE TO INSTITUTE MASSIVE, SUSTAINED ECONOMIC STABILIZATION MEASURES IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NEW FUND PROGRAM. ANY SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY OUR NEW TACK WITH ZAIRE WOULD THUS BE DUE IN PART TO THE FORCE OF CIR-

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

CUMSTANCE.

- PRESIDENT MOBUTU CERTAINLY REALIZED THE PRECIPITOUS NATURE OF HIS RENUNCIATION OF U.S. AID AND DID NOT WANT TO DEEPEN THE CRISIS AT A TIME WHEN ARAB NATIONS WERE WITHDRAWING THEIR DIPLOMATS AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FROM ZAIRE IN RETALIATION FOR MOBUTU'S TEL AVIV GAMBIT. WE BEGAN TO REALIZE AFTER THE RENUNCIATION THAT THE COORDINATED WESTERN APPROACH WHICH DEMANDED REFORM FROM ZAIRE WAS NOT WORKING, AND MOVED TOWARDS A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE BILATERAL APPROACH WHICH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ZAIRE AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER, AND ZAIRE'S RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK WITH THE IMF TO EARN A NEW PROGRAM. THE MISSION REASSURED THE GOZ THAT WE DID NOT EXPECT THIS DEVELOPMENT TO SIGNAL THE END OF OUR AID PROGRAM HERE, AND THESE REASSURANCES WERE REPEATED BY AMBASSADOR JEANNE KIRKPATRICK DURING HER SUCCESSFUL JUNE 26-29 VISIT TO ZAIRE. SHE ALSO REASSURED MOBUTU THAT HE COUNTED IN OUR EYES AND WORKED TO CONVINCE HIM THAT REFORM WAS NEEDED TO ATTRACT OUTSIDE SUPPORT.

- THE SIX WEEK PERIOD BETWEEN THE OCTOBER ARRIVAL OF THE NEW AMBASSADOR HERE AND THE VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH (NOVEMBER 20-23) ALLOWED TIME FOR WASHINGTON AND THE EMBASSY TO FINE-TUNE THE NEW U.S. APPROACH TO ZAIRIAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

- VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S NOVEMBER VISIT TOOK PLACE AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME:

- -- IN OCTOBER ZAIRE HOSTED THE FRANCO-AFRICAN SUMMIT. MITTERAND'S PRESENCE HERE ALONG WITH THE HEADS OF STATE OF MOST FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN COUNTRIES BOOSTED MOBUTU'S SELF IMAGE AND MAY HAVE THUS HELPED CREATE A CLIMATE IN WHICH HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER COMMITTING ZAIRE TO SERIOUS REFORM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 005
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

- -- ALSO IN OCTOBER MOBUTU HAD APPOINTED KENGO WA DONDO PRIME MINISTER. IT WAS CLEAR THAT KENGO HAD BEEN TAPPED TO HEAD ZAIRIAN REFORM EFFORTS AND THUS THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DELIVER OUR MESSAGE AT THE NASCENT STAGE OF THIS NEW LEADERSHIP.

- WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT ARRIVED, HE MADE OUR PITCH MASTERFULLY: (A) ZAIRE, AS ONE OF AFRICA'S MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES, LED BY ONE OF ITS GREATEST LEADERS, HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY ON THE CONTINENT; (B) THE U.S. WANTS TO HELP ZAIRE BUT WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DO SO UNTIL CERTAIN REFORMS ARE MADE...ZAIRE MUST WORK WITH THE IMF AND THE USG WILL BE AN INTERESTED, SUPPORTIVE OBSERVER IN THE NECESSARY PROCESS OF ZAIRIAN ECONOMIC AND FISCAL REFORM. PRIME MINISTER KENGO EXPRESSED THE GOZ'S COMMITMENT TO

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

FOLLOW THROUGH ON AN ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM AND POINTED TO REFORM EFFORTS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THE MINERALS AND AGRICULTURE SECTORS.

- IN DECEMBER OF 1982, A CABINET-LEVEL GOZ ECONOMIC DELEGATION VISITED WASHINGTON WITH A SPECIFIC LIST OF PROPOSED ECONOMIC REFORMS. THEY SOUGHT OUR INTERCESSION WITH THE FUND, BUT WERE TOLD THAT WE HAD NO DIRECT ROLE TO PLAY IN THAT PROCESS. HOWEVER, THE POSITIVE MOOD OF MEETINGS LEFT DELEGATION MEMBERS CONFIDENT ENOUGH ON THEIR RETURN TO ZAIRE TO RELAY A TOUGH MESSAGE TO MOBUTU: ZAIRE MUST TAKE MATTERS INTO ITS OWN HANDS BY EMBARKING ON SERIOUS REFORMS AND TAKING UP NEGOTIATIONS UNILATERALLY WITH THE FUND. THE MPR CONGRESS, ALSO IN DECEMBER, PROVIDED A FORUM FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE NATION OF A FURTHER SERIES OF REFORMS WHICH INCLUDED BUDGET CONTROLS, STIMULATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION.

- THE USG BEGAN AT THIS POINT TO PLAY A CATALYTIC ROLE BETWEEN THE GOZ AND THE IMF. WE HAD ENCOURAGED THE GOZ TO APPROACH THE IMF ANEW, AND NOW WE WERE ENCOURAGING THE IMF TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT ZAIRIAN REFORM EFFORTS. A SHADOW IMF PROGRAM WAS FIXED FOR ZAIRE AND THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN IN EARNEST TO POLICE ITS SPENDING AND IMPROVE MANAGEMENT.

- AS 1983 PROGRESSED, IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT PRESIDENT MOBUTU HAD MADE A REAL COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC REFORM. ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT SPENDING WAS CONSISTENTLY UNDER SHADOW PROGRAM CEILINGS; PRICE LIBERALIZATION BECAME A REALITY; TRANSPARENCY BEGAN TO BE ACHIEVED IN GECAMINES MINERALS TRANSACTIONS; A SIGNIFICANT DENT WAS MADE IN GOLD AND DIAMOND SMUGGLING; AND TALKS WITH THE FUND PROGRESSED TO THE MORE FAR-REACHING ECONOMIC STABILIZATION REFORMS NECESSARY TO EARN ZAIRE A NEW IMF PROGRAM.

- IN EARLY AUGUST, 1983 PRESIDENT MOBUTU MADE A SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO WASHINGTON, DURING WHICH HE WAS PRAISED FOR ZAIRIAN SUCCESS IN ADHERING TO THE IMF SHADOW PROGRAM. HE WAS TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT WE COULD NOT INTERCEDE ON ZAIRE'S BEHALF WITH THE IMF. HE REQUESTED INCREASED AID AND WAS GIVEN SOME: A SUPPLEMENTAL 2.5 MILLION IN MAP FUNDS AND LIMITED ESF. IN A ROUND OF CEREMONIES AND MEETINGS, MOBUTU WAS GIVEN THE KIND OF TREATMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE USG THAT HE BELIEVED WAS HIS DUE AS A FAITHFUL FRIEND.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519

SCR

PAGE 006

NC 4675519

TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

- THE BULK OF ZAIRIAN STABILIZATION REFORMS WERE INSTITUTED IN SEPTEMBER, 1983 AND THE WEEKS JUST PRIOR TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THESE REFORMS WERE MARKED BY LAST

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

MINUTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FUND IN WHICH THE USG PLAYED AN IMPORTANT FACILITATIVE ROLE. ALSO IN SEPTEMBER, THE PARIS CLUB HELD PRELIMINARY MEETINGS TO CONSIDER RE-SCHEDULING ZAIRE'S DEBT TO PUBLIC CREDITORS. THE U.S. TOOK THE LEAD IN CONVINCING MEMBER NATIONS TO BE FORTH-COMING AND, BY THE END OF DELIBERATIONS, A COMMITMENT WAS MADE ADEQUATE TO CLOSE ZAIRE'S FINANCING GAP ONCE A FUND PROGRAM WAS IN PLACE. ZAIRE WAS GRANTED ITS PROGRAM IN DECEMBER AND HAS STUCK WITH ITS TOUGH PROVISIONS THROUGHOUT THE FIRST HALF OF 1984.

- B. HUMAN RIGHTS: ON MAY 17, 1983 MOBUTU ANNOUNCED A GENERAL AMNESTY FOR ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND EXILES. THE "GROUP OF 13" EX-PARLIAMENTARIANS WHO HAD TRIED TO FORM A SECOND POLITICAL PARTY WERE RELEASED. WE PRAISED THIS DEVELOPMENT IN MEASURED TERMS AND, WHEN SOME POLITICAL ARRESTS BEGAN TO TAKE PLACE AGAIN IN LATE JULY, WE MADE CLEAR THAT OUR CONCERN WAS FOR THE WELFARE OF THE INDIVIDUAL ARRESTEES, NOT FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO FORM A SECOND PARTY. WE ALSO DEMONSTRATED OUR CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS BY INSTITUTING SOME HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECTS.

- C. CHAD: U.S./ZAIRIAN COOPERATION IN ADDRESSING THE THREAT POSED BY THE LIBYAN-BACKED INVASION OF CHAD IN JUNE, 1983 ADDED ANOTHER DIMENSION TO OUR IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS. ZAIRE ROTATED INTO THE SC CHAIRMANSHIP JUST BEFORE DEBATE ON CHAD BEGAN AND, WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE GOZ, WE SUCCEEDED IN GAINING U.N. ENDORSEMENT FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE HABRE GOVERNMENT. WE MADE CLEAR OUR APPRECIATION FOR ZAIRIAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON CHAD, AS WELL AS FOR HELPFUL ZAIRIAN EFFORTS ON OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES (E.G. THE GOZ'S MODERATING VOICE IN DEBATE AT THE 1983 GROUP OF 77 MINISTERIAL, AND ZAIRE'S SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE CONDEMNING SOVIET AGGRESSION IN DOWNING THE KAL AIRLINER).

- AN EVEN MORE CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF U.S./ZAIRE COOPERATION IN THE CHAD EFFORT HAS BEEN THE REGULAR, ONGOING AIRLIFT SUPPORT FOR ZAIRIAN TROOPS COMMITTED TO AID THE HABRE GOVERNMENT. ZAIRE'S JULY 1983 DECISION TO GO TO HABRE'S AID RESULTED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY IN ACCESS TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE ZAIRIAN MILITARY FOR THE DAO AND MILITARY MISSION HERE. BY MODERATING FROM THE BEGINNING ZAIRIAN EXPECTATIONS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR THIS NEW CHAD EFFORT, THE AID WE HAVE PROVIDED HAS PAID GREATER DIVIDENDS IN BILATERAL GOOD WILL.

- D. BROOKE AMENDMENT AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE: BROOKE AMENDMENT SANCTIONS LASTED FROM JANUARY UNTIL AUGUST OF 1982, PREVENTING THE OBLIGATION OF FUNDS FOR MILITARY

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE. THIS PROLONGED SUSPENSION CREATED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 007
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

BAD FEELING TOWARDS THE U.S.; BOTH BECAUSE THE ZAIRIANS FELT THEY HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY WARNED ABOUT BROOKE, AND BECAUSE THEY WERE BURDENED WITH MAINTAINING A MILITARY CONTINGENT IN THE CHAD OAU PKF FOR MUCH OF THIS PERIOD. WITH THE RATIFICATION IN AUGUST OF OUR BILATERAL DEBT RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT, BROOKE SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED, ALLOWING NEW CASES TO BE SIGNED AND DELIVERIES TO BEGIN DURING THE LATTER THIRD OF THE YEAR. RECOGNIZING ZAIRIAN DISBELIEF THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE USG COULD NOT TURN BROOKE ON AND OFF AT WILL, WE BEGAN TO EXPLAIN BROOKE AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY. OUR ENCOURAGEMENT AND ASSISTANCE BOLSTERED ZAIRE'S SERIOUS COMMITMENT TO MEET BROOKE PAYMENTS DURING 1982 AND ENABLED THE SMOOTHER FUNCTIONING OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

- THE SPRING OF 1984 SAW THE RETURN TO SERVICE OF A ZAIRIAN AIR FORCE CARGO C-130, A CONCRETE RESULT OF ONGOING U.S./ZAIRIAN COOPERATION TO RESOLVE ZAIRE'S ITALIAN C-130 DEBT. BEGINNING IN EARLY 1982, BOTH ZAMISH (OUR MILITARY MISSION HERE) AND THE EMBASSY HAD MOUNTED AN EFFORT TO DISABUSE THE GOZ OF HOPES THAT WE WOULD UNILATERALLY BAIL IT OUT OF ITS DEBT. THE TWO VISITS TO ZAIRE IN 1983 BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NOEL KOCH BROUGHT A HIGH-LEVEL FOCUS TO THE PROBLEM, AND SOME U.S. ASSISTANCE: SEVEN UNREPAIRED ENGINES AND 1200 SPARE PARTS WERE RELEASED BY THE ITALIANS IN JANUARY, 1984 TO BE REPAIRED IN THE U.S. UNDER EXISTING FMS CASES.

- E. BILATERAL STRAINS: THE CODEL WOLPE VISIT: THE LATE AUGUST 1983 CODEL WOLPE VISIT TO KINSHASA, JUST AS MOBUTU WAS RETURNING FROM HIS FOREIGN TOUR, PUT THE HEIGHTENED BILATERAL GOODWILL TEMPORARILY AT A RISK. SKILLFULLY PLAYING ON CODEL SYMPATHIES, MEMBERS OF THE OUTLAWED UDPS ("GROUP OF 13") AND THEIR SUPPORTERS HELD A DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE OF THE CODEL'S KINSHASA HOTEL AFTER A LENGTHY MEETING BETWEEN THE CODEL AND UDPS LEADERS. THE ZAIRIAN SECURITY SERVICES INTERVENED AND ROUGHED UP SOME OF THE EX-PARLIAMENTARIANS UNDER THE HORRIFIED GAZE OF A CODEL MEMBER. THIS PLUNGED CONGRESSIONAL/ZAIRIAN RELATIONS TO A NEW LOW AND IT REQUIRED A CONCERTED EFFORT BY THE USG AND GOZ TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WITH ALMOST A YEAR'S HINDSIGHT TO GUIDE US, WE SEE THE TWO PRINCIPAL RESULTS OF CODEL WOLPE AS FOLLOWS:

- -- THE INESCAPABLE REALITY OF THE USG'S JANUS-HEADED APPROACH TOWARDS FOREIGN RELATIONS WAS BROUGHT FIRMLY HOME TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU. IT APPEARS HE HAS RECONCILED HIMSELF TO LIVE WITH THE REALITY THAT CONGRESS IS NOT CONTROLLED BY THE PRESIDENT.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

- -- NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS ZAIRE HAVE HARDENED, AND PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TO EMANATE FROM THAT QUARTER TO PRESS MOBUTU ON HUMAN RIGHTS REFORM AND TO LIMIT ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE.

- F. CONSULAR PROBLEMS: A CONTINUING IRRITANT IN U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS BEEN THE ZAIRIAN FAILURE TO HONOR ITS COMMITMENT UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION TO PROMPTLY NOTIFY US OF THE ARRESTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND ALLOW US EXPEDITIOUS ACCESS TO IMPRISONED AMERICANS. IN SEVERAL INSTANCES, WE FOUND OUT ABOUT IMPRISONED AMERICANS FROM THIRD PARTIES SOME TIME AFTER

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CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519

SCR

PAGE 008

NC 4675519

TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

THE FACT. ZAIRE'S IMMIGRATION SERVICE HAS ALSO PROVED RECALCITRANT IN THE PROMPT PROCESSING OF REQUESTS BY AMERICANS RESIDENT HERE FOR VISA SERVICES.

III. THE CURRENT STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS: LESS

POSTURING, MORE REALISM MEAN A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE

U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS ARE CURRENTLY EXCELLENT. EVENTS OVER THE LAST 24 MONTHS HAVE LEFT THE ZAIRIANS PLEASED AND COMFORTABLE WITH THE RELATIONSHIP AND OUR DEALINGS ARE NOW ON A FRIENDLIER, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE FOOTING.

THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION WHICH MUST BE ANSWERED ABOUT OUR CHANGE IN APPROACH TO ZAIRE OVER THE LAST 24 MONTHS IS: HAS IT BEEN WORTH IT? HAS OUR DECISION TO DE-EMPHASIZE DIRECT FRONTAL PRESSURE FOR REFORM IN FAVOR OF ENCOURAGEMENT AND AN INDIRECT FACILITATIVE ROLE WITH THE IMF BORNE VISIBLE FRUIT? WE BELIEVE THE ANSWER IS UNEQUIVOCALLY YES. ZAIRE HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT, EVEN BOLD ATTEMPTS TO REFORM ITS ECONOMY AT A CONSIDERABLE SHORT-TERM SOCIAL COST WHICH SINCERELY CONCERNS ITS LEADERS. ALMOST 18 MONTHS AFTER LAUNCHING THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION EFFORT, IT IS CLEAR THAT ZAIRE HAS MADE MANY HARD SACRIFICES AND HAS DEMONSTRATED THE WILL TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON ITS REFORM EFFORT. THIS NEW ZAIRIAN WILL, WE BELIEVE, RESULTS FROM A NEW REALISM ON THE PART OF MOBUTU AND GOZ POLICYMAKERS. THEY CLEARLY REALIZE THAT THE DAYS OF A FREE RIDE AT THE EXPENSE OF COPPER, COBALT OR THEIR ALLIES ARE OVER, AND THAT THEY MUST PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN THEIR RECOVERY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ZAIRE IS RESOLVED, OR IN A POSITION, TO FOREGO FOREIGN AID, INVESTMENTS OR FUTURE RESCHEDULINGS. ON THE CONTRARY, NEW, LARGE-SCALE CAPITAL INPUTS AND DEBT ADJUSTMENTS WILL BE A CLEAR NECESSITY IF ZAIRE'S SUCCESSFUL STABILIZATION IS TO LEAD TO RECOVERY AND GROWTH. IT IS A MEASURE OF THEIR NEW MATURITY (AND OF

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, EAID, MASS, SHUM, CG

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF U.S./ZAIRE RELATIONS

THE RELATIONSHIP'S NEW TENOR) THAT, REALIZING THIS NEED, THE ZAIRIANS HAVE NOT BECOME STRIDENT AND POSTURING.

A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF OUR NEW APPROACH TO ZAIRE BECOMES MORE PROBLEMATIC WHEN WE CONSIDER PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT OUR FRIENDLIER RELATIONS WITH, AND LESS DRAMATIC REPRESENTATIONS TO, MOBUTU HAVE HELPED IN THIS AREA. THE "GROUP OF 13" EX-PARLIAMENTARIANS ARE NO LONGER IN JAIL AND, THOUGH THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE RESTRICTED, THEY ARE LIVING WITH THEIR FAMILIES AND THEIR LOT APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT IMPROVED. THEIR FATE UNDER A MENGISTU, RAWLINGS OR DOS SANTOS WOULD BE LESS BENIGN.

LOOKING AHEAD, WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY THAT OUR FRIENDLIER RELATIONS WITH THE CURRENT REGIME WILL CAUSE US PROBLEMS IN A POST-MOBUTU ZAIRE. OUR VISIBLE, MORE EFFECTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM -- WITH ITS MAJOR ACCENT ON EXCHANGE PROGRAMS -- AS WELL AS OUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECTS GIVE US WIDE, FAVORABLE PRESS AMONG MANY ZAIRIANS WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE BE INCLINED TO RESENT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOBUTU. THE "GROUP OF 13" AND THEIR SUPPORTERS HAVE NOT GIVEN UP ON THE WEST (NOR, AS A MOVEMENT COMPOSED BASICALLY OF AN ETHNIC BOURGEOISIE SEEKING DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND PURSUIT OF THEIR OWN BUSINESS INTERESTS IN A LIBERAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, ARE THEY LIKELY TO). NO OTHER

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CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 009
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

 VIABLE ORGANIZED OPPOSITION EXISTS, AND WE SEE NO SIGNS
 OF GROWING ANTI-AMERICANISM IN ANY QUARTER OF ZAIRIAN
 SOCIETY.
 -

- IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE, TOO, THAT WHILE WE HAVE
 FRIENDLIER RELATIONS WITH MOBUTU, WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT THE
 KIND OF INTIMACY THAT CHARACTERIZED OUR RELATIONSHIP IN
 THE 1960'S. SUCH CLOSENESS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE NOR
 DESIRABLE HERE. MOBUTU HAS OUTGROWN THE FEELINGS OF
 DEPENDENCY THAT EXISTED IN THOSE PATERNALISTIC DAYS, AND
 MUCH OF OUR RECENT BILATERAL DIFFICULTY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED
 TO HIS RESIDUAL DISCOMFORT WITH THE SUBORDINATE ROLE HE
 SAW HIMSELF PLAYING. WE BELIEVE HE NOW SEES HIMSELF IN A
 STATESMANSHIP ROLE, PERHAPS THINKING MORE OFTEN OF HOW
 POSTERITY WILL TREAT HIS REGIME, AND LESS OFTEN ABOUT HOW
 TO PROFIT FROM EACH OCCASION. HE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HE
 VALUES OUR COUNSEL AND WE, BY TREATING HIM AS A SOVEREIGN
 HEAD OF STATE, HAVE MADE OURSELVES HEARD WITHOUT ANTAG-
 ONIZING HIM.
 -

- MORE REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
 IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAVE RESULTED IN BETTER
 MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND A FIRMER FOUNDATION FOR CONTINUED
 PROGRESS TOWARD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORM IN ZAIRE.
 THE FOLLOWING ARE CHECKLISTS OF WHAT WE SEE AS EACH

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E.D. 12356: DECL: OADR
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COUNTRY'S CURRENT EXPECTATIONS FROM THE BILATERAL
 RELATIONSHIP (IN DESCENDING ORDER OF IMPORTANCE). WHERE
 RELEVANT, WE FOLLOW EACH POINT WITH PARENTHETICAL REMARKS
 NOTING WHEN EXPECTATIONS HAVE BEEN ALTERED. WE NEXT USE
 THE TWO LISTS TO HIGHLIGHT LIKELY AREAS OF FUTURE MIS-
 UNDERSTANDING OR CONFLICT.
 -

- A. WHAT DOES ZAIRE EXPECT FROM THE RELATIONSHIP?
-
- -- STRATEGIC PROTECTION.
- -- CONTINUED HIGH-LEVEL ASSURANCES OF INTEREST IN AND
 SUPPORT FOR MOBUTU'S ZAIRE (WHILE WE MAY HAVE RAISED EXPEC-
 TATIONS WITH EXTENT OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT OVER THE LAST
 TWO YEARS, WE BELIEVE THAT THESE CONTACTS IN THEMSELVES
 MEET A PSYCHOLOGICAL NEED, AND DO NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY
 A PROMISE OF GREATER CONCRETE BILATERAL ASSISTANCE).
- -- RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT FOR MOBUTU AS AN AFRICAN
 LEADER ON REGIONAL ISSUES.
- -- CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR INEVITABLE FUTURE REQUESTS
 FOR IMF PROGRAMS.
- -- ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR MASSIVE RESCHEDULING OF
 ZAIRE'S PARIS CLUB DEBT.
- -- CONTINUED SUPPORT IN THE IBRD FOR DEVELOPMENT
 PROJECTS.
- -- HIGHER LEVELS OF GRANT AID MILITARY ASSISTANCE
 (TEMPERED BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT LEVELS CANNOT BE INCREASED
 PRECIPITOUSLY).
- -- ASSISTANCE FOR MASSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
 (THOUGH THE ZAIRIANS HAVE FEWER ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE MAG-
 NITUDE OF THAT ASSISTANCE).
- -- INCREASED U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT.
- -- LESS PUBLIC CRITICISM OF ZAIRE, ESPECIALLY ON
 HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS (MOBUTU NOW KNOWS THERE IS LITTLE
 HE -- OR WE -- CAN DO ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM,
 HOWEVER).
- -- ASSISTANCE TO ASSURE THE CONTINUED FUNCTIONING OF
 THE INGA-SHABA POWER TRANSMISSION LINE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 010
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

- -- CONTINUED LARGE-SCALE PURCHASES OF ZAIRIAN COBALT FOR THE U.S. STRATEGIC STOCKPILE.
- -- A DOUBLE TAXATION TREATY.
-
- B. WHAT DOES THE U.S. EXPECT FROM THE RELATIONSHIP?
-
- -- CONTINUED POLITICALLY STABLE, PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENT.
- -- CONTINUED MOVEMENT TOWARDS ECONOMIC STABILIZATION COMBINED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF A STABLE, PREDICTABLE INVESTMENT CLIMATE.
- -- CONTINUED SERVICING OF ZAIRE'S FOREIGN DEBT.
- -- PROGRESS IN IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (BUT

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- NO EXPECTATIONS THAT MOBUTU WILL CHANGE OVERNIGHT).
- -- CONTINUED ZAIRIAN SUPPORT IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, ESPECIALLY ON ISSUES WHERE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE (WITHOUT EXPECTATIONS THAT ZAIRE WILL TOTALLY ISOLATE ITSELF FROM A "NON-ALIGNED" OR G-77 CONSENSUS).
- -- CONTINUED ACCESS TO RESOURCES, INCLUDING CONTINGENCY ACCESS TO ZAIRIAN AIRFIELDS, FACILITIES, AND AIRSPACE.
- -- CONTINUED ZAIRIAN INITIATIVES IN SUPPORT OF PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION.
- -- BETTER DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION TO INCLUDE MORE RATIONAL USE OF OUR AND OTHER DONORS' INPUTS.
- -- AVOIDANCE OF VISIBLE EXTREMES IN ZAIRIAN BEHAVIOR (SUCH AS HARSH SUPPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, OR, IN THE ECONOMY, PROFLIGATE SPENDING ON PARTY EVENTS OR CONSPICUOUS FOREIGN TRAVEL).
- -- GREATER RESPECT FOR ZAIRIAN OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE VIENNA CONSULAR CONVENTION.
-
- C. LIKELY AREAS OF FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDING OR CONFLICT:
-
- -- THE U.S.'S INTEREST IN SEEING A CONTINUED POLITICALLY STABLE, PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENT IN ZAIRE WILL ENSURE THAT WE CONTINUE TO PROVIDE STRATEGIC SUPPORT TO THIS COUNTRY. IT SHOULD FOLLOW ALSO THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE HIGH-LEVEL ASSURANCES OF INTEREST IN AND SUPPORT FOR MOBUTU'S ZAIRE, THOUGH THIS IS AN AREA WHERE, LACKING A CONSCIOUS EFFORT, WE COULD EASILY SLIP INTO THE DAMAGING TAKE-ZAIRE-FOR-GRANTED MODE OF EARLIER YEARS, OR PAY INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO MOBUTU HIMSELF.
-
- -- CONFLICT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ZAIRE, THOUGH MISUNDERSTANDINGS SHOULD BE FEWER THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS; MOBUTU NOW BETTER UNDERSTANDS CONGRESS'S ROLE AND ATTITUDE, AND SHOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO OUR CONCERNS IN THE BETTER OVERALL CLIMATE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THREATS AGAINST ZAIRIAN SECURITY (E.G. THE RECENT BOMBINGS AT THE MAIN POST OFFICE AND VOICE OF ZAIRE) COULD LEAD THE AUTHORITIES TO TAKE REPRESSIVE MEASURES THAT WOULD FUEL U.S. CRITICISM OF ZAIRIAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.
-
- -- THIS BETTER UNDERSTANDING WILL TEMPER BUT NOT ELIMINATE ZAIRIAN EXPECTATIONS OF ASSISTANCE FOR MASSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. AS FY85 AID LEVELS WILL BE AT LEAST AS HIGH AS '84 LEVELS, THIS SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM IN THE SHORT TERM. WE HOPE THE SAME IS TRUE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE LEVELS.
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 011
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

- -- THE HIGH PRIORITY WE PLACE ON CONTINUED ECONOMIC

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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STABILIZATION IN ZAIRE DOVETAILS WITH ZAIRIAN EXPECTATIONS THAT WE WILL SUPPORT FUTURE REQUESTS FOR IMF ASSISTANCE. MISUNDERSTANDING MAY ARISE FROM UNWARRANTED ZAIRIAN EXPECTATIONS THAT WE WILL INDUCE THE IMF TO MITIGATE THE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA IMPOSED ON ZAIRE.

- -- ZAIRE'S SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE IN SERVICING ITS FOREIGN DEBT INDICATES THAT U.S. EXPECTATIONS OF GOZ PERFORMANCE WILL BE MET TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. AS LONG AS THE GOZ FOLLOWS IMF GUIDANCE, NO CONFLICT IS LIKELY ON ZAIRIAN EXPECTATIONS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR FUTURE RE-SCHEDULING BY THE PARIS CLUB.

- -- ZAIRIAN STANDS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA AND THEIR INITIATIVES IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

- -- WE CAN EXPECT CONTINUED MISUNDERSTANDING OVER (THE LACK OF) ZAIRIAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION. WE WILL ALSO SEE CONFLICT OVER THE U.S.'S ROLE IN THE IBRD, WHERE ZAIRE WILL EXPECT US TO VOTE UNRESERVEDLY FOR ZAIRIAN PROJECTS AND WHERE WE MAY HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS.

- -- DISAPPOINTMENT IS PROBABLY INEVITABLE OVER THE USG ROLE IN ATTRACTING U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT TO ZAIRE, AS WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PRODUCE THE FLOOD OF INVESTMENT DESIRED BY THE ZAIRIANS.

- -- THE INGA-SHABA LINE WILL LOOM LARGE IN THE COMING YEAR BECAUSE OF PROBABLE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN ITS CONTINUED OPERATION. WE HAVE A PARALLEL INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE LINE'S VIABILITY: ZAIRE BECAUSE IT WILL NEED THE POWER, THE U.S. BECAUSE OF THE PROJECT'S HIGH VISIBILITY.

- -- MISUNDERSTANDING IS LIKELY ON THE ISSUE OF GSA COBALT PURCHASES FOR THE STRATEGIC STOCKPILE. THE ZAIRIANS MENTION THIS ISSUE OFTEN, AND WILL BE KEENLY DISAPPOINTED IF, IN LIGHT OF HIGHER PRICES, PURCHASING LEVELS TAPER OFF.

- -- CONSULAR ISSUES WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN IRRITANT AND MAY REQUIRE MORE FORCEFUL ACTION THAN THE REPEATED DEMARCHES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE IN KINSHASA.

- -- THERE SHOULD BE FEW MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON ANCILLARY ISSUES IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP SUCH AS A DOUBLE TAXATION TREATY, BUT THESE ISSUES WILL WARRANT CLOSE ATTENTION.

- -- THERE IS A CONTINUING LIKELIHOOD THAT PRESIDENT MOBUTU WILL FEEL TEMPTED TO SPEND LARGE SUMS OF MONEY ON

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WASTEFUL PROJECTS OR PARTY EFFORTS. THOUGH WE BELIEVE THE LIKELIHOOD OF EXTRAVAGENCE IS SHARPLY REDUCED BY IMF PREMISES, SUCH ACTIONS COULD QUICKLY CAUSE DIFFERENCES.
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84 4675519 SCR

PAGE 012
TOR: 161454Z JUL 84

NC 4675519

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